UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-14-2008

Bradford v. Roche Moving & Storage, Inc.
Appellant's Reply Brief 1 Dckt. 34854

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Bradford v. Roche Moving & Storage, Inc. Appellant's Reply Brief 1 Dckt. 34854" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1749.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1749

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN TKE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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BARRY BRADFORD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

)
)

Supreme Court No. 34854

1
1

VS.

)

1

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF

ROCHE MOVING & STORAGE, INC.,
)
Employer, and LIBERTY NORTHWST )
INSURANCE CORPORTATION, Surety, )
and
FRONTIER MOVING 62 STORAGE, INC., )
Employer, and IDAHO STATE
INSURANCE FUND, Surety,

C

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRiEF

........................................................................
APPEAL FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO
Chairman James F. Kile, Presiding
Paul T. Curtis, Esq.
CURTIS & BROWNING, PA
598 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorney for Appellant

Mr. Monte R. Whittier, Esq.
HARMON, WHlTTIER & DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-7561
Attorney for Respondent Roche, et.al.
Mr. Scott R. Hall
ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL, SMITH
P.O. Box 5 1630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630
Attorney for Respondent Frontier, et.al.

CLAIMANTIAPPELLANT'S REPLY

In it's Opposition to Claimant/Appellant's Opening Brief, Defendanmespondent
Frontier Moving & StorageJState Insurance Fund ("Frontier") argues that the
Commission's findings were based on "substantial and competent evidence," and
therefore Claimant's appeal must be denied. [Frontier's Opposition Brief, p. 91 Frontier
further argues that the argument involving the "emergency doctrine" is a "new issue"
Claimant should not be able to raise on appeal, and there was no "emergency" even if the
emergency doctrine is considered.
DefendantRespondent Roche Moving & Storagekiberty Northwest Insurance
Corporation ("Roche"), in it's Opposition Brief, argues in essence that Claimant is
inappropriately asking the Court to "reweigh and reapply the evidence" [Roche's
Opposition Brief, p. 121 Further, Roche argues that Claimant was properly deemed a
''vololueer" by the Referee when this accident occurred. Roche also makes essentially
the same arguments regarding emergency as did Frontier.
Both Frontier and Roche argue they are entitled to attorney's fees in addition to
costs on appeal.

REPLY ARGUMENT:
The issue at the hearing held on May 3 and 4,2007, was clearly defined as
follows: "Who was claimant's employer or was claimant an independent contractor on
August 9,2007?" Tr. p. 7, L. 9 -10.
Neither Frontier nor Roche disputes that the above states the issue at the hearing
of this matter. No objections were made at the hearing when the above issue was stated.
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The material facts in this accident are not in dispute. Whether Claimant had to
climb over a forWift or not to get to the ladder is not material. [Frontier's Opposition, p.
231 One important material fact not in dispute is that Claimant was

an independent

contractor when this accident happened. It is further not disputed that a "lumpern and
"day laborer" are both considered employees.
The issue was intentionally framed as above stated because who Claimant's
employer was at the time of this accident was a significant question. Roche had recently
been taken over by Frontier, but the sale had not been entirely completed at the time of
this accident. Even though Claimant was clearly somebody's employee, it was not clear
who that was when he was injured.
Claimant contends that the Commission made an error of application of the law to
the clear facts of this case and the Industrial Commission's legal conclusions are freely
reviewable by this Court. Niehart v. Universal Jt. Auto Parts, Znc., 141 Idaho 801,803,
118 P.3d 133,135 (2005)
Upon determining that Claimant was not an independent contractor, the Referee
should have then turned to the issue of who was Claimant's employer, instead of going to
volunteer status, which was not an issue at hearing.
The Commission, by bringing up the new issue of whether or not Claimant was a
volunteer when he was injured, opened the door to the proper application of the rule of
law to the facts of this case as they relate to implied employment - including proper
application of the emergency doctrine. If it is error to bring up the emergency doctrine as
a new issue at this lime, as Defendants argue, it was first error for the Commission to
bring up the "volunteer" issue.
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Claimant contends that application of the emergency doctrine is neither a new
issue nor an attempt to change the underlying facts. It is an application of the law to the
facts, which legal doctrine the C o d s s i o n erroneously failed to either consider or apply
in coming to it's decision.
With respect to what constitutes an emergency, clearly the weight of authority
provides that protection of an employer's property can be considered an emergency. As
argued previously, regarding emergency services, it is worth repeating that Larsen, on
Workerman's Compensation Law, the leading authority on work comp law, states that:
"It is well established that a person who is asked for help in an
emergency which threatens the employer's interest becomes an employee
under an implied contract of hie. The most familiar example is that of the
farmer or bystander who is called upon by an employed trucker to help get
the truck out of the mire in which it is stuck." I Larsen, Workmen's
Compensation Law, $65133, p. 65-15.
As previously argued, the undisputed facts of this case go much further toward
employment than a mere bystander who is asked to help push out a stuck truck. There is
no question that the stuck garage door in this case stopped business, denying ingress and
egress into and out of the storage facility - essentially shutting down the business for as
long as the door was stuck. According to Chad Rose, Frontier's General Manager at the
time, it was important to the business that day to get the door open because they had a
shipment going out, ready to be loaded onto a truck. Tr. p. 150. Chad Rose testified that
one of the reasons he allowed Claimant to work on the door and try to un-jam it was
"because maybe he [Claimant] knew something that you [Chad Rose] or Scott didn't
know." Tr. p. 152. Clearly the employer's interest was threatened by the stuck door.
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With respect to Defendants' demand for attorney's fees, Defendants' are also in
error. I.A.R. 41 addresses attorney's fees on appeal and there is no authority for the
award of attorney's fees against a worker's compensation claimant who unsuccessfully
appeals to the Supreme Court of Idaho. Swanson v. Kruj, Zw., 116 Idaho 3 15,775 P.2d
629 (1989)

CONCLUSION
At the time of this accident, Claimant respecmly contends that the undisputed
facts show he was either a "lumper" or "day laborer" and was neither an independent
contractor nor a volunteer.
Defendant's arguments that Claimant should be precluded from arguing the "new
issue" of the emergency doctrine is a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. Based on
their arguments, it was first error for the Commission to consider the new issue of
whether or not Claimant was a "volunteer," since that issue was not included in the issues
to be addressed at the hearing.
Defendant's arguments that they are entitled to attorney's fees are also without
foundation in either fact or law.
Claimant respectfully asks the Court for relief, and a finding that the C l b t
was an employee when he was injured on August 9,2006, and is entitled to both medical
and income benefits.

Dated:
Attorney for Claimanu Appellant
Barry Bradford
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